The Abolition of Sex/Gender Registration in the Age of Gender Self-Determination: An Interdisciplinary, Queer, Feminist and Human Rights Analysis by Cannoot, Pieter & Decoster, Mattias
Reviewed Article                                       International Journal of Gender, Sexuality and Law 
26 
 
The Abolition of Sex/Gender Registration in the Age of Gender Self-
Determination: An Interdisciplinary, Queer, Feminist and Human Rights Analysis 
Pieter Cannoot and Mattias Decoster1  
 
Abstract 
It is commonly accepted that gender matters (whether cisgender, transgender/trans*, 
gender non-binary, genderfluid, gender queer, agender, or other) and many are 
raising awareness about the fact that gender always seems to matter. That gender 
matters, and always matters, does not necessarily mean, however, that gender needs 
to be authenticated or endorsed by the state. 
In fact, based on a feminist and queer reading of human rights, this 
interdisciplinary article asserts that state-sponsored sex/gender assignment through 
the practice of sex/gender registration must halt. It argues that mandatory (binary) 
sex/gender registration disproportionately infringes the emerging right to gender 
identity autonomy and the right to the legal recognition thereof. Most often, our 
Western heterosexual cultural system of gender, which posits the existence of two 
oppositional and complementary gender identities, anchored in so-called natural and 
binary sex, goes hand in hand with material and discursive forms of violence and 
entails various forms of unequal power dynamics. Hegemonic in nature, the 
heterosexual cultural system of gender pervasively regulates many (if not every) 
aspects of all bodies’ lives and being, including by legal means. The law upholds and 
certifies that specific gender regime, inter alia, by assigning a sex to individuals at birth 
(through the registration of a claimed evident, objective, natural element to be found 
on or in the body by inspection). Policies of mandatory (binary) sex/gender 
registration therefore constitute the cornerstone of the legalisation of the heterosexual 
cultural system of gender, which produces not only the conventional feminine and 
masculine gender identity (i.e. women and men) but also sex (i.e. females and males). 
This article suggests that, as long as the law refuses to go beyond the 
compulsory male/female (or even male/female/other) framework, it will be complicit 
in upholding the undesired consequences of the heterosexual cultural system of 
gender, which affect all persons of whatever gender or physical features. Therefore, 
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undoing remaining forms of global gender injustice, as well as respecting, protecting 
and fulfilling human rights relating to gender identity, requires the abolishment of 
sex/gender registration instead of expanding the available gender markers. Indeed, 
this article finds that current state practices do not pursue a legitimate aim, and even 
if they do, mandatory sex/gender registration does not pass the proportionality test 
that is required in the assessment of restrictions of fundamental rights. A human rights 
analysis of official sex/gender in the age of gender self-determination finds mandatory 
sex/gender registration to be a disproportionate measure and recommends that states 
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It is commonly accepted that gender matters (whether cisgender, transgender/trans*, 
gender non-binary, genderfluid, gender queer, agender, or other) and many are 
raising awareness about the fact that gender always seems to matter (van den Brink, 
2016). That gender matters, and always matters, does not necessarily mean, however, 
that gender needs to be authenticated or endorsed by the state. In fact, based on a 
feminist and queer reading of human rights, this interdisciplinary article asserts that 
state-sponsored sex/gender assignment through the practice of sex/gender 
registration must halt. It argues that mandatory (binary) sex/gender registration 
disproportionately infringes the emerging right to gender identity autonomy and the 
right to the legal recognition thereof. Hence, from a human rights perspective, it 
would be beneficial to alter current state practices regarding sex/gender registration 
in order to leave policies of mandatory (binary) sex/gender registration behind. 
Moreover, potential problems arising from this shift in policy (such as sex/gender 
based demographic research for policy objectives or the operationalisation of state 
action to combat discrimination on the basis of sex/gender) can easily be solved, as 
will be demonstrated below.  
 
Most often, our Western heterosexual cultural system of gender, which posits 
the existence of two oppositional and complementary gender identities anchored in 
so-called natural and binary sex, goes hand in hand with material and discursive 
forms of violence and entails various forms of unequal power dynamics (Butler, 2007; 
McNeilly, 2014). As Ruocco (2016) holds, trans* persons disproportionately experience 
homelessness, unemployment and poverty; they are therefore more likely to be 
exposed to (government-controlled) programmes and facilities such as shelters, 
unemployment programmes, prisons, etc. Hence, they are more likely to be in 
positions where the discrepancy between legal gender and one’s experienced and/or 
lived gender identity may be problematic. This article suggests, however, that as long 
as the law refuses to go beyond the compulsory male/female (or even 
male/female/other) framework, it will be complicit in upholding the undesired 
consequences of the heterosexual cultural system of gender which affects all persons, 
of whatever gender and physical features. Practices of sex/gender registration (and 
especially mandatory and binary ones) turn a particular cultural gender regime into a 
legal one and thereby legalise and legitimise the inequalities and harmful effects that 
come with that gender regime. Therefore, undoing remaining forms of global gender 
injustice, as well as respect for, protection of, and fulfilment of human rights relating 
to sexual orientation and gender identity, requires the abolishment of sex/gender 
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registration instead of expanding the available gender markers. Doing so is beneficial 
to trans* and cisgender individuals alike. 
 
In order to support that claim, this article consists of two substantive parts; the 
first relates to the recent legal evolutions regarding sex/gender registration (Part I), the 
other examines feminist and queer legal theory (Part II). Part I first outlines the present 
human rights framework regarding sex/gender registration and reveals the growing 
importance given to self-determination in matters related to sexual orientation and 
gender identity. It finds the development in international human rights law of a right 
to gender identity, as well as a right to the legal recognition thereof. Moreover, and 
internationally speaking, an increased number of states have recently moved beyond 
the strictly binary interpretation of sex/gender by introducing a “third” sex/gender 
category. In doing so, these states slowly but surely end the erasure and 
marginalisation of trans*, non-binary and genderqueer people, as well as individuals 
with variations in sex characteristics. These evolutions (and in particular European 
evolutions) will also be scrutinised in Part I. Part II dives into feminist and queer legal 
theory in order to demonstrate the socially constructed character of, and 
performativity inherent to the notions of “sex” and “gender”, and further comments 
upon the heterosexual cultural system of gender producing (the binary interpretation 
of) these concepts. After having set forth the ways in which that gender regime, 
consciously and unconsciously, adversely affects all bodies, Part II proceeds to 
contend that mandatory (binary and non-binary) sex/gender registration 
disproportionately infringes on the right to gender identity and the legal recognition 
thereof. It argues that, despite progressive evolutions in sex/gender registration, 
gender autonomy can only be satisfied by a complete abolition of state-sponsored 
sex/gender registration. As will be highlighted before concluding, alternatives to the 
existence and registration of an official sex/gender marker are available whenever it 
might be deemed useful to document one’s sex/gender. 
 
Part I: Sex/gender registration in present (human rights) law 
 
The current status of the vast majority of legal systems worldwide shows how self-
evident the law considers sex/gender registration and the “male”/“female” dichotomy 
to be, and how the registration framework fails to account for bodily and gender 
diversity (O’Brien, 2015). This is best evidenced by the registration of sex/gender in 
documents that are included in official civil registers, and especially birth certificates. 
The importance of the birth certificate – and official registration, in general – cannot 
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be overlooked. First and foremost, birth registration recognises the existence of a new-
born child as a person before the law, as foreseen by Article 7 of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (CRC) and Article 24(2) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) (van den Brink, 2016). When including a sex/gender 
marker, the birth certificate codifies the sex/gender of a new-born child, giving it the 
aura of truth and permanence, institutionalising (most often) “male” or “female” as a 
characteristic of identity to this particular child (Reilly, 2006). According to queer legal 
scholar Gonzalez-Salzberg, through sex/gender registration ‘every person is 
constructed by the law as a legal woman or a legal man, and this legally imposed 
sex/gender is the first assumption of a person’s identity. […] This legal attribution has 
the value of a truth that is, at the same time, read in and imposed on the body’ (2014, 
799). In civil law systems, the official birth registration is a central source for personal 
records that informs all other government registers and databases. This is an 
important difference with common law systems, which usually keep separate records 
for different purposes, such as birth registration, identity cards, drivers’ licenses and 
international passports (van den Brink, Tigchelaar, 2014). In many legal systems, the 
registered sex/gender becomes part of the individual’s civil status, which defines the 
central aspects of one’s legally relevant identity. A person’s registered sex/gender 
might become relevant on the basis of several legal provisions that lead to 
differentiation in legal status on the basis of one’s sex/gender. In many legal systems, 
for example, registered sex/gender gains relevance as a requirement for marriage or 
civil partnerships, regarding filiation, or in questions of name law (Gössl, 2016). 
 
A child’s sex/gender registration at birth is typically based on a superficial 
check of the new-born’s external genitalia by a medical professional present at birth 
(Greenberg, 1999). However, while this registration at birth is clearly based on the 
biological composition of the new-born child, it also stereotypically presupposes – at 
least in the legal sense – congruence between that person’s sex and their later-
developed gender identity. This cisnormative logic is best evidenced by procedures of 
legal gender recognition. On the basis of gender recognition, it is possible to have one’s 
legal sex marker amended in light of one’s (experienced) gender identity. Upon 
completion of such procedure, this registered gender identity becomes the sole source 
of information regarding that person’s sex/gender, and therefore the sole sex/gender 
marker for all possible aims that are related to sex/gender. In other words, after legal 
gender recognition, sex registration actually has to be perceived as registration of 
gender identity. Nevertheless, in order to retain the cisnormative logic as far as 
possible, many states across the globe demand trans* people to undergo some form of 
medical intervention regarding their sex characteristics before applying for legal 
gender recognition. Through gender affirming surgeries and hormonal treatment, 
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harmony between sex and gender identity is again reassured, at least for legal 
purposes.   
 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, binary sex/gender registration, and 
particularly psycho-medical requirements for legal gender recognition, have received 
much legal attention, both at the international and national levels. Indeed, besides 
being conceptually based on stereotypes of sex and gender, the strictly binary M/F 
categories and medical requirements for legal gender recognition are also disputable 
from a human rights perspective. During the last decade, trans* and intersex 
pathologisation and medicalisation, as well as sex/gender normativities in law, have 
been increasingly criticised in light of the (emerging) right to self-determination of 
gender identity. The following sections will therefore establish the current dominant 
human rights standards concerning sex/gender registration (section A), as well as 
relevant developments in state practice (section B). 
 
A. Current human rights framework 
 
Although at this point it might seem self-evident to have procedures that enable the 
correct registration of a person’s gender identity, it needs to be discussed whether a 
right to (the legal recognition of) gender identity exists in human rights law in the first 
place. In this regard, state obligations to enable changes in registered sex were only 
recently framed in terms of gender recognition and self-determination. While authors 
like Lau (2020), Theilen (2020), and Baisley (2016) agree that gender identity rights 
exist or are emerging under international human rights law, others disagree (see 
Baisley, 2016). Moreover, a vast number of states – in all continents – resist the 
recognition of gender identity rights in international law, especially within the more 
“political” bodies of the United Nations (UN), such as the Human Rights Council 
(HRC). The contentious nature of sexual orientation and gender identity as human 
rights issues within the HRC was recently evidenced by the discussions concerning 
the renewal of the mandate of the UN Independent Expert on sexual orientation and 
gender identity. While 27 countries voted in favour, twelve voted against and seven 
abstained. Since rights related to sexual orientation and gender identity are still one 
of the most contentious issues in contemporary human rights law across the globe 
(Chase, 2016), sexual and gender minorities remain a global “group” vulnerable to 
structural discrimination, and do not have a human rights treaty or instrument 
specifically dealing with the issues they face. The most relevant developments in 
terms of trans* rights therefore have to be looked for in soft law instruments and 
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jurisprudence. While it is important to note that soft law is ‘not law at all, strictly 
speaking (…), virtually all legal scholars would agree that they are not simply politics, 
either’ (Guzman, Meyer, 2010, 172). Soft law acquires legitimacy because it is 
incorporated into hard law, or because legal and political actors reference it, or even 
because states simply abide by it as they believe it to be the appropriate norm. 
Therefore, one can safely state that obligations do effectively flow from soft law. 
Moreover, it has been shown that soft law has played an important role in the 
advancement of LGBTQIA+ rights in Europe (Kollman, 2009).  
 
The (emerging) right to (legal recognition of) gender identity is predominantly 
connected to the broader right to personal autonomy, which is a generally accepted 
standard of international human rights law. On the basis of this autonomy framework, 
all psycho-medical requirements for legal gender recognition and the absence of non-
binary options are considered to be human rights violations. This can be noted in 
several international (soft law) instruments, starting with the Yogyakarta Principles 
+10, which promote an LGBTQIA+ inclusive reading of existing and generally 
accepted standards of international human rights law on issues of sexual orientation, 
gender identity and sex characteristics, and enjoy great authority around the world 
(O’Flaherty, 2015). Principle three holds that states shall ‘[…] Take all necessary 
legislative, administrative and other measures to ensure that procedures exist whereby all state-
issued identity papers which indicate a person’s gender/sex — including birth certificates, 
passports, electoral records and other documents — reflect the person’s profound self-defined 
gender identity […]”’. On the basis of Principle 31, states shall:  
‘A)  Ensure that official identity documents only include personal information that is 
relevant, reasonable and necessary as required by the law for a legitimate purpose, and 
thereby end the registration of the sex and gender of the person in identity documents 
such as birth certificates, identification cards, passports and driver licences, and as part 
of their legal personality; 
B)  Ensure access to a quick, transparent and accessible mechanism to change names, 
including to gender-neutral names, based on the self-determination of the person; 
C)  While sex or gender continues to be registered: 
i. Ensure a quick, transparent, and accessible mechanism that legally recognises and 
affirms each person’s self-defined gender identity; 
ii. Make available a multiplicity of gender marker options; 
iii. Ensure that no eligibility criteria, such as medical or psychological interventions, a 
psycho-medical diagnosis, minimum or maximum age, economic status, health, marital 
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or parental status, or any other third party opinion, shall be a prerequisite to change one’s 
name, legal sex or gender; 
iv. Ensure that a person’s criminal record, immigration status or other status is not used 
to prevent a change of name, legal sex or gender.’ 
In 2015, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) adopted Resolution 
2048 (2015), which not only welcomed the emergence of a right for every individual 
to recognition of their gender identity and the right to be treated and identified 
according to this identity, but also called on states to develop quick, transparent, and 
accessible procedures based on self-determination for changing the name and 
registered sex of trans* people on birth certificates, identity cards, passports, 
educational certificates, and other similar documents. PACE also suggested that states 
should consider broadening registration categories with a third gender option for those 
who seek it. The same call regarding legal gender recognition and gender self-
determination was repeated in PACE Resolution 2191 (2017). Regarding non-binary 
gender recognition, the Assembly strengthened its recommendations by explicitly 
calling on states to ensure, wherever gender classifications are in use by public authorities, 
that a range of options are available for all people. In other words, a single third option 
for gender recognition (e.g. ‘X’) would no longer be sufficient to meet the requirements 
stemming from the right to self-determination.  
 
UN human rights treaty bodies, such as the HRC, the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CmEDAW) have also started to bring attention to the 
situation of trans* persons in their General Comments and country-specific 
concluding observations (van den Brink, 2017). In November 2017, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights issued an advisory opinion which held that – referring inter 
alia to the Yogyakarta Principles +10 – all individuals have the right to have their name 
and official documents amended in the light of their gender identity, solely on the 
basis of self-determination, and therefore without having to comply with any medical 
requirements (IACtHR 24 November 2017, OC-24/17). 
 
Moreover, a (limited) right to (legal recognition of) gender identity can also be 
deduced from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Indeed, 
according to the Court, rights to gender identity and to personal development are a 
fundamental aspect of the right to respect for private life (ECtHR 6 April 2017, A.P., 
Garçon, Nicot v. France). Although it has only once explicitly placed individual 
decisions regarding one’s gender identity under the scope of the right to personal 
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autonomy ex Article 8 of the ECHR (ECtHR 6 April 2017, A.P., Garçon, Nicot v. France), 
the ECtHR considers that ‘elements such as gender identification, names, sexual 
orientation and sexual life fall within the personal sphere protected by Article 8’ 
(ECtHR 10 March 2015, Y.Y. v. Turkey), of which the guarantees are interpreted based 
on the underlying principle of personal autonomy (ECtHR 12 June 2003, Van Kück v. 
Germany). With regard then to the legal recognition of this self-defined gender identity, 
the true landmark case has been Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom (ECtHR 11 July 
2002), in which the Court found that the matter could no longer fall within the state’s 
margin of appreciation, save for the appropriate means of achieving this recognition 
(i.e. the conditions for legal gender recognition). It affirmed this ruling in later case 
law (e.g. ECtHR 10 March 2015, Y.Y. v. Turkey), in which it even held that the legal 
recognition of one’s “sexual identity” amounts to a right under Article 8 ECHR 
(ECtHR 6 April 2017, A.P., Garçon, Nicot v. France). In X v. the Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (ECtHR 17 January 2019) and Y.T. v. Bulgaria (ECtHR 9 July 2020), the 
Court added that this legal recognition must be based on ‘quick, transparent and 
accessible procedures’, mirroring the wording of PACE Resolution 2048 (2015).  
 
The Court’s recognition of a right to gender self-determination does not mean 
that the legal recognition should be made fully unconditional. Even though cases 
concerning aspects of medical gender affirming therapy had previously reached the 
Court, it did not, until 2017, explicitly address the question of whether making medical 
requirements a prerequisite for obtaining legal gender recognition is in conformity 
with the ECHR. Although the Court has since considered a condition of compulsory 
sterility to be a violation of Article 8 ECHR (ECtHR 6 April 2017, A.P., Garçon, Nicot v. 
France), it has so far refused to fully depathologise trans* persons. Indeed, the Court 
has upheld the condition of providing evidence of the existence of the “syndrome of 
transsexuality” and the possibility for the state to order the performance of a medical 
expert examination (ECtHR 6 April 2017, A.P., Garçon, Nicot v. France). Moreover, it 
has also – sometimes in a very artificial manner – refused to directly address the 
compatibility of mandatory surgical gender affirming procedures with the ECHR 
(ECtHR 17 January 2019, X v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). The ECtHR is 
therefore less progressive than its American counterpart and not fully in line with 
most recent soft law standards, most specifically regarding trans* pathologisation and 
medical requirements for legal gender recognition. Nevertheless, the ECtHR’s case 
law on trans* issues continues to enjoy great authority throughout the Council of 
Europe. In any case, the ECtHR is the human rights monitoring body that has dealt 
with the largest number of cases related to gender identity and (the conditions for) the 
legal recognition thereof (Gonzalez-Salzberg, 2014).  




B. Current state practice 
 
i. Legal gender recognition based on gender self-determination 
 
In spite of the ECtHR’s cautious approach, developments in international human 
rights law thus seem to indicate the emergence of both a right to gender identity and 
a right to the legal recognition thereof, solely on the basis of personal autonomy/self-
determination. Moreover, since 2012, a small yet rapidly increasing number of 
countries worldwide have adopted an administrative procedure of legal gender 
recognition based on personal autonomy/self-determination. Although these states, – 
which include Argentina, Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Norway, Portugal, and Uruguay – represent only a limited group of 
progressive leaders at the national level, they are important not only because of the 
legal result that they achieved, but arguably also because of the more general change 
in attitude that they help to bring about (Koffeman, 2015). 
 
Despite the fact that most of these states have retained some administrative 
procedural barriers, such as a waiting period, information obligations, or an advice by 
the public prosecutor, they have all removed every lasting psycho-medical condition 
for the legal recognition of adults’ gender identity. The situation regarding the legal 
recognition of gender identity of minors differs considerably. Of the aforementioned 
list, most states – except for Argentina, Iceland, Malta and Uruguay – make use of a 
fixed age limit for legal gender recognition, ranging from five years (Luxembourg), 
six years (Norway), 14 years (Chile), to 16 years (Belgium, Ireland, Portugal). Denmark 
does not allow for the possibility for minors to change their registered sex. Moreover, 
minors often have to comply with additional requirements, such as parental consent 
or assistance/representation (Argentina, Belgium, Iceland, Ireland, Malta, 
Luxembourg, Norway [between six and 16 years], Portugal and Uruguay), a 
psychiatric assessment of their (general or gender specific) discernment (Belgium, 
Ireland, Portugal) and/or the involvement of the judiciary (Argentina, Ireland, Malta). 
The question arises whether these additional requirements are compatible with the 
principle of respect for the increasing autonomy of children included in Article 12 of 
the CRC. Moreover, it may be argued that (relatively high) fixed age limits for gender 
recognition force trans* children to remain confronted with identity documents that 
do not correspond to their experienced reality, potentially exposing them to stigma, 
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bullying and discrimination (Neuman Wipfler, 2016). In other words, it can be 
questioned whether the sex/gender registration frameworks of even the most 
progressive states fully take into account the child’s best interests as foreseen by 
Article 3 of the CRC. 
 
ii. Breaking the sex/gender binary 
 
Internationally, various states have either voluntarily introduced, or have been forced 
by the courts to recognise, a “third”, non-binary sex/gender category. These states 
include Nepal (Supreme Court, Sunil Babu Pant and Others v. Nepal Government and 
Others, 2008), India (Supreme Court, National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, 
2014), Australia (High Court of Australia, NSW Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages 
v. Norrie, 2014), New Zealand (New Zealand, Identity and Passports Office, last 
updated 2018), Canada (Canada, Department of Immigration, Refugees and 
Citizenship, 2017) and (parts of) the US (US Federal Court for the district of Colorado, 
Zzym v. Pompeo, 2018). European state practice concerning non-binary sex/gender 
registration varies significantly. While in many states the appropriateness of 
sex/gender registration has not been publicly debated yet, queer and intersex activists 
have recently – and in some cases successfully – challenged mandatory binary 
sex/gender registration in several countries, both in courts and through policy reform 
advocacy. This section illustrates several state practices regarding sex/gender 
registration that currently exist within European legal orders, which include 
mandatory binary registration, mandatory non-binary registration, and optional non-
binary registration until a certain age or for certain people.  
 
On May 4, 2017, the French Court of Cassation endorsed a lower court’s 
decision to refuse the applicant’s request for a legal sex/gender change from male to 
“neutral”, because ‘his physical appearance and social behaviour’ (Cass Civ (1) 4 May 
2017, n°531, free translation) were that of a man (the applicant had a beard as a 
consequence of hormonal treatment for osteoporosis and was married to a woman 
with whom they had adopted a child). The Court of Cassation seemed to agree with 
the lower court’s conflation of sex, gender and sexual orientation, since it validated 
that court’s reasoning and asserted that ‘the duality of sex/gender determinations in 
the civil register pursues a legitimate aim because it is necessary for the social and 
legal organisation of society, of which it constitutes a foundational element’ (Cass Civ 
(1) 4 May 2017, n°531, free translation and emphasis added). According to the Court, 
mandatory binary sex/gender registration is proportionate to the legitimate aim 
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pursued (namely, the social and legal organisation of society) and hence constitutes a 
lawful interference with the right to private life enshrined in Article 8 of the ECHR. 
Because the binarity of sex/gender is said to have a “foundational” character, 
sex/gender registration remains mandatory and binary (M/F) in France.  
 
The High Court in London equally found on June 22, 2018, that ‘at present the 
claimant’s Article 8 [ECHR] right to respect for the claimant’s personal life [does] not 
encompass a positive obligation on the part of the Government to permit the claimant 
to apply for and be issued with a passport with an ‘X’ marker in the gender/sex field’ 
(R on the application of Christie Elan-Cane v. Secretary of state for the Home Department 
[2018], [131], emphasis added). It therefore ruled in favour of the Government, which 
argued that mandatory binary sex/gender registration pursues the legitimate aims of 
‘maintaining security and combatting identity theft and fraud, ensuring security at 
national borders, and ensuring the personal safety of the passport holder’ (R on the 
application of Christie Elan-Cane v. Secretary of state for the Home Department [2018], [52]). 
In March 2020, the judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal (R (Christie Elan-Cane 
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020]). As a consequence, the legal non-
recognition of non-binary gender identities constitutes a lawful interference with 
Article 8. For reasons of national security, mandatory and binary sex/gender 
registration (M/F) thus also remains in practice in the UK.  
 
In the Netherlands, however, the Court for the District of Limburg (Rechtbank 
Limburg) ruled on May 28, 2018, that Article 8 entails a positive obligation incumbent 
on the state to accept the applicant’s non-binary gender identity (28 May 2018, 
C/03/232248 / FA RK 17-687). The applicant’s sex/gender was altered in the civil 
register to ‘cannot be determined’ and they have been given an internationally valid 
passport that reads ‘X’ under the sex/gender entry. Consequentially, Dutch passports 
with a third category sex/gender marker can be issued upon application to a judge, 
who can order the civil servant of the civil register to recognise the applicant’s non-
binary sex/gender. The Court’s ruling essentially extended the scope of the application 
of Article 1:19d of the Dutch Civil Code. On the basis of this provision, if the sex of a 
child is unclear at birth, a period of three months is granted in order to determine 
which sex (M/F) should be registered. If, after this period, the sex remains unclear, the 
child’s birth certificate will state that the sex ‘cannot be determined’. This 
“indeterminate” sex marker can be rectified through a judicial procedure (Article 1:24 
of the Civil Code) to “male” or “female” later on in life. Although the provision 
originally aimed at providing flexibility in the case of the birth of an intersex child, the 
Court’s ruling now also suggests that non-binary trans* persons, born without a 
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variation of sex characteristics, could have their binary sex/gender marker changed to 
the non-binary marker under Article 1:19d. In February 2020, the Court for the District 
of Central-Netherlands (Rechtbank Midden-Nederlands) adopted a similar ruling (10 
February 2020, C/16/488796 / FO RK 19-1452). 
 
Malta floats somewhere between mandatory and optional non-binary 
sex/gender registration, given that Article 278 of the Maltese Civil Code (amended by 
Article 7, §4 of the Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics Act 
2015) allows persons exercising parental authority to not register a new-born’s 
sex/gender. If a child’s sex/gender marker is left unspecified at birth, persons 
exercising parental authority or a guardian must apply to the civil court for a 
declaration of the child’s gender identity (M/F) before the minor reaches the age of 
eighteen. The minor must give express consent and their best interests and evolving 
capacities must be taken into account. (Although the provision seems to offer the 
possibility of leaving open the registered sex of all new-born children, it is argued in 
the literature that it is aimed [only] at intersex children [Herault et al., 2018].) 
Sex/gender registration in Malta therefore remains mandatory for adults. Since the 
Autumn of 2017, all people who do not identify as either “male” or “female” may have 
their sex/gender marker on official documents such as their identity card, passport, or 
residence permit, changed to “X”. However, this does not apply to birth certificates. 
Together with Iceland, Malta is presently the only European country to recognise non-
binary gender identities, fully rely on an administrative procedure of self-attestation, 
and to make an “X” marker available to everyone. 
 
While no European state has abolished sex/gender registration altogether, 
Germany and Austria came close to introducing a policy of truly optional and non-
binary sex/gender registration for all purposes. In the end, however, they stuck to a 
policy of mandatory and binary sex/gender registration for all, save for those with a 
variation of sex characteristics. In 2009, CmEDAW invited Germany to engage in a 
dialogue with its civil society organisations with the view of better protecting the 
human rights of trans* and intersex individuals (CmEDAW/C/DEU/CO/6, 2009). As a 
result of the consultations, Article 1, §6, b) of the Act to Amend Civil Status Law of 
May 7, 2013 (Personenstandsrechts-A ̈nderungsgesetz 2013 [Germany]) provided that 
an infant had to be registered as “male” or “female” unless the infant’s sex/gender 
could not be determined, in which case the sex/gender entry was to be left blank. In 1 
BvR 2019/16, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) declared that 
provision to be in breach of the constitutional rights to personality and to non-
discrimination based on gender, ‘insofar as it imposes an obligation on persons to state 
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their gender and does not allow for a positive gender entry other than “female” or 
“male” for persons whose gender development deviates from female or male gender 
development and who permanently identify as neither male nor female’ (BverfG, 10 
October 2017, 1 BvR 2019/16). The Court suggested to the legislature that it abolish 
sex/gender registration altogether and obliged it, in any event, to ‘enact provisions 
that are compatible with the Constitution by 31 December 2018’. Given that Germany 
does not distinguish linguistically between sex and gender (using Geschlecht for both 
terms), one could have inferred from the ruling, which mandates the legislature to 
introduce non-binary option(s) under the Geschlecht entry so long as sex/gender 
registration is required, that both an actual non-binary sex category, as well as a non-
binary gender category for people identifying outside the gender binary, had been 
recognised. This would have meant that sex/gender registration became optional and 
non-binary (M/F/non-binary/blank) for all, which would have been beneficial to 
intersex and trans* individuals alike (and, as will be demonstrated in the next part, to 
any individual, whether or not they identify as cisgender). However, the legislature 
decided to ignore the Court’s suggestion (which had been supported by the German 
Ethics Council) to abolish sex/gender registration, and instead adopted on December 
18, 2018, the Act Amending the Information to be Entered in the Birth Register (Gesetz 
zur Änderung der in das Geburtenregister einzutragenden Angaben 2018 [Germany]). 
When the Geschlecht of an infant cannot be determined at birth, the sex/gender entry 
may now be left blank, or filled in with “diverse” (Article 1, §2). Moreover, Article 2 
stipulates that ‘persons with a variant of sex/gender development’ may declare to the 
civil servant of the civil register that their sex/gender entry should be changed to either 
male, female, “diverse”, or blank (§1), provided that they produce a medical certificate 
attesting to a variation of sex characteristics (§2). Intersex and trans* advocates have 
criticised this reform because it leads to the further pathologisation of variations in sex 
characteristics and dismisses the opportunity to establish the legal recognition of non-
binary gender identities for trans* persons (Organisation Intersex International 
Germany, 2018). In May 2019, the German federal government announced a proposal 
for a new amendment of the sex/gender registration framework, which would make 
it possible for all persons to change their registered sex (be it male, female, diverse or 
unspecified) to one of the available options: “male”, “female”, “diverse” or 
“unspecified”. However, the material conditions for changing one’s registered sex 
would still have been different for persons with variations with sex characteristics and 
transgender persons. This proposal was eventually again set aside following negative 
responses by various intersex and transgender interest groups (Theilen b, 
forthcoming).  
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Recent developments regarding sex/gender registration in Austria are 
practically the same as in Germany. On June 15, 2018, the Austrian Constitutional 
Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) ruled in favour of an intersex applicant and found that 
mandatory binary sex/gender registration constituted an unlawful breach of Article 8 
of the ECHR for individuals with ‘a variation in Geschlecht development’ – the term 
Geschlecht again referring both to what is called “sex” as well as “gender” in English 
(VfGH, 15 June 2018, G77/2018-9). It ordered that the 2013 Austrian Civil Status Act 
(Bundesgesetzes über die Regelung des Personenstandswesens 2013 [Austria]) need 
not be amended but should be interpreted differently in order to guarantee its 
conformity with the Constitution and the ECHR. Given that the Act does not specify 
which gender markers are to be used, but only that a child’s sex/gender must be 
registered at birth, the Court set forth that an additional option should be made 
available for those who wish to affirmatively express their “alternative” sex/gender 
identities, and hinted at, amongst others, “inter”, “diverse” or “other”. Moreover, the 
possibility of leaving the Geschlecht entry blank can also be achieved through 
constitutional interpretation, since the Act provides that the civil servant may adapt 
the civil register in order to enter missing data, which entails that the possibility of not 
having a sex/gender is contained in the Act itself. While this ruling, like its German 
counterpart, presented an opportunity to make sex or gender registration optional and 
non-binary for all individuals, the Austrian Ministry of the Interior issued a circular 
letter to every civil servant in which it explained that the Geschlecht entry may be left 
open at birth in case physicians cannot determine the infant’s sex/gender due to the 
Court’s ruling. It may later on be changed to “diverse” only with a medical report and 
the approval of a “VdG-Board” – VdG standing for Variante der Geschlechtsentwicklung, 
or variation in sex/gender development (Ministry of Interior, BMI-VA1300/0528-
III/4/b/2018 2018 [Austria]). To conclude, both in Germany and Austria, sex/gender 
registration is optional and potentially non-binary for people whose sex cannot be 
determined at birth (M/F/divers/blank). In the absence of physicians attesting a 
variation of sex characteristics, however, sex/gender registration remains mandatory 
and binary (M/F). In case one has been assigned “male” or “female” at birth, a legal 
sex/gender change to a non-binary gender marker is later only possible with the 
approval of a medical board in Austria, or a medical certificate testifying the existence 
of a variations of sex characteristics in Germany. 
 
In June 2019, the Belgian Constitutional Court followed the German and 
Austrian examples (GwH 19 June 2019, 99/2019) by striking down several parts of the 
2017 Gender Recognition Act (Wet tot hervorming van regelingen inzake 
transgenders wat de vermelding van een aanpassing van de registratie van het 
geslacht in de akten van de burgerlijke stand en de gevolgen hiervan betreft 2017 
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[Belgium]), which had installed a new – yet binary – framework of legal gender 
recognition based on self-determination. The Court considered the absence of any 
form of recognition of non-binary persons in the Act to be a violation of the 
constitutional right to equality, read together with the right to gender self-
determination ex Article 8 of the ECHR. The Court held that persons with a binary 
gender identity and persons with a non-binary gender identity are comparable 
categories. In light of the right to gender self-determination and the legislature’s aim 
to give all individuals maximal chances to be recognised as who they really are, it did 
not consider the binary or non-binary nature of one’s gender identity to be a pertinent 
criterion for differential treatment in procedures of legal gender recognition. Indeed, 
both binary and non-binary persons have the same interest in not being obliged to 
have identity documents that do not match their experienced reality. Concurring with 
the German Constitutional Court, the Court considered the fact that breaking the 
sex/gender binary would lead to additional legal changes was no justification for the 
differential treatment. Reflecting the ECtHR’s statement in Christine Goodwin v. United 
Kingdom, it held that society may be expected to tolerate certain inconveniences in 
order to allow all persons to live a life in dignity in conformity with their gender 
identity. Although it is the legislature that needs to implement the judgment, the 
Court suggested some solutions. According to the Court, the legislature could decide 
to add one or more categories for the registration of sex and gender identity at birth 
and in the procedure of legal gender recognition, or it could eliminate sex and gender 
identity as elements of a person’s civil status. The latter option could result in the end 
of public and compulsory sex/gender registration in Belgium. 
 
Part II: Sex/gender registration and the right to gender autonomy as an emerging 
human rights standard 
 
As well as examining the extent to which sex/gender registration needs to be reformed 
in order to meet the requirements set by the right to gender self-determination, it is 
also worth questioning whether sex/gender registration as such is actually in 
conformity with gender autonomy. Even assuming arguendo that the state should be 
able to register sex/gender in pursuit of legitimate aims, the proportionality of the 
current system of blanket registration, which is not explicitly connected to a specific 
aim, can be questioned. Indeed, van den Brink (2016) and Spade (2011) have argued 
that blanket registration of sex/gender very often actually represents an unconscious 
habit, rather than a pertinent government tool.  
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Moreover, the practice of sex/gender registration rests upon a particular vision 
of the world, which posits that bodies can readily be biologically determined as either 
male or female, whose gender identity is respectively, and innately, either masculine or 
feminine, and who are mutually attracted to each other (Valdes, 1995). In this natural 
order, birth certificates are said to (merely) record, rather than constitute, sex/gender 
as an objective given, a stable fact, an immutable matter of physiology. Feminist queer 
theory suggests, however, that sex/gender is neither biological nor binary. Taking into 
consideration the performativity inherent to gender, one could question whether 
mandatory (binary) sex/gender registration pursues a legitimate aim, and argue that 
it disproportionately infringes the right to gender autonomy as an emerging human 
rights standard as described above. This part asserts that, so long as the law does not 
move beyond the currently developing “M/F/X” framework, it will be complicit in 
upholding the hegemonic, heterosexual cultural system of gender, which produces 
not only “heterosexuality” but also “sex” and “gender” (i.e. males/men and 
females/women). Moreover, this system, consciously or unconsciously, adversely 
affects all persons. Despite the fact that sex/gender registration may provide for a 
shield of legitimacy in daily life to those who identify as trans* and who decided to 
alter their legal sex/gender, advancing gender justice for all requires abolishing 
mandatory (binary) sex/gender registration in the long run and is the only policy truly 
respectful of the right to gender autonomy.  
 
A. The social construction of sex/gender 
 
In order to fully grasp that ‘gender is not what culture creates out of my body’s sex; 
rather, sex is what culture makes when it genders my body’ (Wilchins, 1997, 58), it is 
useful to go back in time and recall the emergence of third wave feminist literature. 
Departing from lesbian experiences, queer feminists indicted earlier feminist 
engagement with patriarchy (in an attempt to liberate women’s “universal” 
subordinated position) because of its careless essentialising nature, which led to the 
marginalisation of those who failed to conform to ideals of heterosexual, cisgender, 
white middle-class womanhood. They contend that cultural and radical feminist 
theories, which are premised on universalised lived experiences of heterosexual, 
cisgender, white middle-class women which fail to factor in various forms of lesbian, 
trans*, and black insights (Currie, 1992), in fact reproduce oppression whilst aiming 
for emancipation. This is because subjects or bodies are required to comply with the 
identity category for whom that liberation is sought (i.e. the heterosexual, cisgender, 
white, middle-class woman) if ever they wish to be(come) politically and linguistically 
represented, and thus intelligible - that is, legitimate subjects (Halley, 2006). Hence, 
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they argue that oppression lies in the concept of “woman” itself, which they recognise 
as a venue for semantic struggle and which has in part been defined in exclusionary 
terms by earlier feminist advocacy (such as the Michigan Womyn’s Music Festival’s 
“womyn-born womyn” only policy). According to queer feminists, “women” does not 
reflect (as second wave feminists assert) but rather shapes an illusionary unity of 
bodies, always physically differing based on so-called natural sex (Butler, 2007). As 
such, “sex” constitutes a social construct and is a regulatory ideal which, together with 
the notions of “men” and “women”, instructs subjects (or bodies) to perceive 
themselves, despite their unique physical features, as either female or male (i.e. as 
dualistically sexed) and consequentially to behave womanly or manly (i.e. in line with 
predefined gender identities) in order to live up to their sexed nature (Weiss, 2001). 
As a consequence, ‘there may not be a subject who stands before the law, awaiting 
representation in or by the law. Perhaps, the subject, as well as the invocation of a 
temporal “before”, is constituted by the law as the fictive foundation of its own claim 
to legitimacy’ (Butler, 2007, 4). But if there is no category “women”, objectively, 
naturally and biologically united through sex – if, ‘strictly speaking, a woman cannot 
be said to exist’ (Kristeva, 1981, as referred to by Butler, 2007, 1), how then should we 
conceive of sex? 
 
Wittig argued that sex is ‘the political category that founds society as 
heterosexual’ (1992, 5). It is, therefore, ‘itself a gendered category, fully politically 
invested, naturalized but not natural’ (Butler, 2007, 153). Indeed, the category of sex 
as a social construct or regulatory ideal assists the institutionalisation through 
naturalisation of heterosexuality, which by definition presupposes the existence of 
subjects for whom gender identity and desire are oppositionally tailored (Butler, 
2007). By allowing for the naturalisation of gender - that is, by inducing subjects to 
believe in gender’s objectivity or prediscursiveness - the category of sex assists the 
heterosexual cultural system of gender in legitimising its hegemony. In blunt terms, 
that pervasive but particular system of gender ‘looks at my body, creates a narrative 
of binary [gender] difference, and says, “Honest, it was here when I arrived. It’s all 
Mother Nature’s doing’ (Wilchins, 1997, 51). Observing bodily diversity (whether 
between “males” and “females”, within “males” and “females”, or between and in 
between “males”, “females”, and any other unlabelled or yet labelled bodies, such as 
intersex bodies) queer feminists acknowledge that ‘material bodies are negotiated 
through everyday practice and are themselves a site of power’ (Currie, 1992, 73). 
Therefore, bodies can only be said to be “female” or “male” because the heterosexual 
cultural system of gender negotiated them – that is, it employed its power to compel 
them to dualistically perceive themselves as belonging to either one group or the other, 
and consequentially coerced them into behaving in line with the socially constructed, 
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and oppositionally-defined, conventional gender roles which allow heterosexual 
attraction to be played out (and imposed). Gender is not expressive of sex; gender 
rather effects sex (Butler, 2007), and hence we speak of sex/gender.  
 
Inspired by phenomenology and language philosophy, Butler disjoins gender 
from physical substance and substitutes a theory of gender premised on ontology for 
one based on performativity (Butler, 2007). For Butler, gender is not something which 
is socially constructed based on “natural” sex, or which acts upon “biological”, 
“immutable” sex. Instead, it is something which bodies (having learnt to recognise 
themselves as sexed) incessantly reproduce and thereby produce – that is, perform – 
by rendering determinate or concrete predefined or socially constructed ways of being 
feminine or masculine in the present. Butler argued that these ‘historical possibilities 
materialized through various corporeal styles are nothing other than those punitively 
regulated cultural fictions that are alternately embodied and disguised under duress’ 
(1997, 404). Sex/gender could thus be understood as something which is time and 
again (re)constituted by specific embodiments, i.e. corporeal acts and movements, 
imitating the regulatory ideals that are “woman” and “man” produced by the 
heterosexual cultural system of gender. In other words:  
 
‘because there is neither an essence that gender expresses or externalizes nor an 
objective ideal to which gender aspires, and because gender is not a fact, the 
various acts of gender create the idea of gender, and without those acts, there 
would be no gender at all. Gender is, thus, a construction that regularly conceals 
its genesis; the tacit collective agreement to perform, produce, and sustain 
discrete and polar genders as cultural fictions is obscured by the credibility of 
those productions – and the punishments that attend not agreeing to believe in 
them’ (Butler, 2007, emphasis added, 190).  
 
The heterosexual cultural system of gender requires the institutionalisation of both 
material and discursive gendered violence in order to secure its continuity, for 
“deviant” gender performances suggest the arbitrariness of conventional heterosexual 
sex/gender. Logically, ‘if the relationship between sex, gender and sexual identity 
does not apply to gays and lesbians, it need not apply to anyone, and the categories of 
masculinity and femininity are exposed as normative fictions’ (X, Patriarchy is such a 
drag, 1995, 1989). With regard to material gendered violence, one can refer to the 
enforced conventional sex-affirming surgeries intersex infants often undergo (Fausto-
Sterling, 2000). This demonstrates society’s ‘paranoid need to efface all traces of sexed 
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ambiguity’, which ‘makes plain the fact that the sexed categories of male and female 
are culturally constructed and rigorously patrolled’ (O’Brian, 2015, 15). One could also 
hint at the social practice of “gay-bashing” (van der Meer, 2003), which punishes those 
who defy heterosexual sex/gender and discourages others from transgressing the so-
called natural heterosexual order. With regard to discursive gendered violence, one 
may point out that gender queer identities are often unintelligible to those in the 
mainstream, who are conditioned to the extent of not being able to (conceptually) 
comprehend any other gendered existence outside the binarity imposed by the 
heterosexual cultural system of gender (McNeilly, 2014). Because LGBTQIA+ 
individuals most affirmatively defy that system of gender, they are most consciously 
affected by it. However, the gendered violence stemming from the heterosexual 
cultural system of gender is (unconsciously) inflicted at least to a certain degree upon 
any body, including cisgender bodies. Indeed, given that ‘the difference between the 
categories “male” and “female” is maintained by repressing difference within the 
categories’ (Patriarchy is such a drag, 1995, 1976), the heterosexual cultural system of 
gender constricts, inhibits, or contracts all bodies’ ways of being-in-the-world. This 
results in gender role strain and gender role conflict, amongst many other types of 
unfortunate psychological and physical consequences (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2018). Moreover, stigma, discrimination, and other types of social risks, 
as particular forms of gendered violence associated with “effeminate” embodiments 
of masculinity or “unfeminine” femininity performances, induce the reproduction of 
quintessential heterosexual sex/gender and hence keep intact ‘the value given to the 
gender stereotype of the truly “masculine” male typically considered as the norm 
against which all other configurations are unfavourably measured’ (Visser, Picarra, 
2012, 509).  
 
B. The heterosexual sex/gender hegemony and the law 
 
Based upon these insights, one could argue that mandatory (binary) sex/gender 
registration (resting upon the idea that the law merely records a biological fact prior 
to discourse or law) is in fact yet another way the law found to oppressively constitute 
its subjects by regulation, disguised by the invocation of a temporal “before” ‘as the 
fictive foundation of its own claim to legitimacy’ (Butler, 2007, 4). Indeed, in 
mandating (binary) sex/gender registration, the law certifies, legitimises and upholds 
the heterosexual cultural system of gender, now becoming the heterosexual legal 
system of gender (Cooper and Renz, 2016). As long as the law “sexes” or “genders” 
bodies, it facilitates the hegemonic belief in sex/gender’s naturalness and provides a 
legal basis for conventional heterosexual sex/gender to develop, thereby furthering 
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the still-present unequal, gendered power dynamics. Hence, mandatory (binary) 
sex/gender registration constitutes an interference with the right to gender autonomy 
as an emerging human rights standard (cf. Part I). 
 
Furthermore, from a purely legal perspective, one could contend that 
sex/gender registration fails to pass the proportionality test, which is used by human 
rights bodies such as the ECtHR to determine the lawfulness of human rights 
restrictions (Luterán, 2014). Indeed, under many human rights instruments (including 
the ECHR, which applies in the various European countries analysed in Part I), 
restrictions on the free enjoyment of fundamental rights can be justified by legitimate 
aims if there is a proportionate relationship between such aims and the individual 
rights affected (Gerards, Brems, 2017). The ECtHR, for instance, will generally assess 
whether states’ interferences with the rights enshrined in the ECHR (a) are ‘prescribed 
by law’, (b) pursue a legitimate aim, and (c) are necessary in a democratic society, 
which means that restrictions are proportionate to this legitimate objective (Arai, 
2001). The legitimate aims stipulated by the ECHR which may justify the restricted 
enjoyment of qualified rights, such as the right to private life enshrined in Article 8, 
are ‘national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country’, as well 
as ‘the prevention of disorder or crime, (…) the protection of health or morals, or (…) 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. Moreover, a restrictive measure 
will be deemed proportionate if it answers ‘a pressing social need’ (necessity), which 
is ‘relevant and sufficient’ (proportionality in the strict sense), and is designed to 
satisfy that need (suitability) ‘in the least restrictive way’ (Arai, 2001; Fordham, de la 
Mare, 2014).  
 
When the law mandates (binary) sex/gender registration - be it in the form of 
birth registration in a centralised civil register or through multiple records for separate 
purposes -, it not only legalises, legitimises, and imposes upon its subjects the 
heterosexual cultural system of gender (that is, the oppressive and false belief in 
sex/gender’s naturalness, stability, and binarity), but also certifies, decrees, and makes 
itself complicit in the gendered violence stemming from that system, which 
consciously and unconsciously affects all bodies. This legally induced violence, which 
takes the forms (amongst others) of discrimination, social stigma, and gender role 
strain, infringes the right to gender autonomy and does not serve any legitimate aim. 
Indeed, according to van den Brink (2017), present state practice merely echoes the 
assumed ‘naturalness’ and the evident nature of the binary conception of sex/gender. 
Moreover, as Neuman Wipfler argues, ‘as long as the state records gender identity, it 
will also police its boundaries’ (2016, 543). 




However, even if one is of the opinion that sex/gender registration, leading to 
these types of gendered violence, serves the legitimate purpose of national security, 
public safety, or the prevention of disorder or crime, it still fails to pass the pertinence 
and proportionality test. Indeed, one could accept the idea that sex/gender registration 
is required in order to ensure the stability, consistency, and reliability of (the civil 
status, which establishes) one’s legal identity in order to generate legal certainty. 
However, mandatory sex/gender registration is not properly suited to achieve that 
need. Given sex/gender’s fluidity, variances, and socially constructed character, the 
law will never be able to reliably document it – just as it cannot do so for race, religion, 
sexual orientation, or political affiliation. Moreover, it has been said that sex/gender 
registration enables the state to carry out various public health policies, such as 
mandatory preventive cancer screenings and demographic research, or to combat 
existing gender disparities through, for example, affirmative action (Neuman Wipfler, 
2016). Hence, one could contend that mandatory (non-binary) sex/gender registration 
pursues the legitimate aim of protecting public health or women’s rights, and 
therefore answers pressing social needs, such as the overall population’s physical 
well-being or gender equality. However, here again, the gendered violence resulting 
from mandatory (binary) sex/gender registration, in breach of the right to gender 
autonomy, ensures that it does not meet the threshold set by the suitability criterion 
of the proportionality test. Despite the fact that these policies could continue to exist, 
relying on self-identified, instead of state-certified, sex/gender (Neuman Wipfler, 
2016), Cooper and Renz correctly note that ‘just because states withdraw from 
determining and assigning gender does not mean they cannot recognise gender 
determinations by others’ (2016, 496) and consequentially regulate sex/gender in order 
to mitigate existing health discrepancies or unequal power dynamics. Indeed, states 
could, for example, compel private actors, such as sport federations, schools, or 
hospitals, to accept an individual’s self-defined sex/gender, or instead allow these 
private actors to adopt their own definition of it, whilst also enacting ‘regulatory 
frameworks which structure and limit permissible choices’ (Cooper and Renz, 2016, 
497). Hospitals and physicians could thus be given the freedom to determine who and 
how they classify as “male”, “female”, “other”, or any other desired label, but also be 
required to send out an annual invitation for cancer screening to all those they deem 
concerned. It could even be argued that no sexed or gendered label is necessary to 
properly organise, for instance, preventive cancer screenings, since the only relevant 
important element is the presence of a certain bodily characteristic. As one can 
observe, there are plenty of options for states to continue carrying out various public 
health policies, or fight gender discrimination, without coercing individuals to 
identify, and be registered, in line with the heterosexual cultural system of gender. 
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Hence, mandatory (binary) sex/gender registration is not the least restrictive measure 
of the right to gender autonomy needed to satisfy the overall population’s physical 
well-being or gender equality. In this way, mandatory (binary) sex/gender registration 
constitutes an unlawful breach of the right to gender autonomy, which leads us to the 
conclusion that, from a human rights perspective and informed by queer and feminist 
insights, any policy of sex/gender registration as currently required by the law is, 
above all, disproportionate. In any case, as Cruz (2002) states, any loss of sex/gender 





Hegemonic in nature, the heterosexual cultural system of gender pervasively 
regulates many (if not every) aspect of all bodies’ lives and being, including by legal 
means. The law upholds and certifies that specific gender regime, inter alia, by 
assigning a sex to individuals at birth (through the registration of a claimed evident, 
objective, natural element to be found on or in the body by inspection). Policies of 
mandatory (binary) sex/gender registration therefore constitute the cornerstone of the 
legalisation of the heterosexual cultural system of gender, which produces not only 
the conventional feminine and masculine gender identity (i.e. women and men) but 
also sex (i.e. females and males). As long as the law continues to register sex/gender 
(be it in a non-binary fashion), it facilitates the belief in ‘gender as an ahistorical and 
apolitical, natural, pre-existing fact that ought to be correctly recorded on government 
documents’ (Neuman Wipfler, 2016, 523), whereas feminist and queer (legal) theory 
has demonstrated that both sex and gender are socially constructed notions. Indeed, 
even the binary interpretation of sex, traditionally understood as a matter of biology, 
turns out to be the product of culture, serving to legitimise by naturalising socially 
constructed gender. 
 
Because binary sex and gender are regulatory ideals instead of verifiable truths, 
which imperfect or “deviant” gender embodiments expose, the heterosexual cultural 
system of gender producing this binary interpretation mandates the 
institutionalisation of material and discursive gendered violence, in order to rein in 
diverging gender performances and hence keep the system in place. Thus, these types 
of gendered violence induce the (re)production of traditional gender, including the 
unequal hierarchy between masculinity and femininity – the heterosexual cultural 
system of gender defines, limits, and suppresses all bodies’ possibilities of being-in-
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the-world. Whereas, trans* and intersex individuals (as well as other sexual 
minorities) most affirmatively defy that system and are therefore more likely to 
consciously experience these types of gendered violence, the psychological and 
physical negative consequences associated with rigid cultural impositions of gender 
expectations (and, in particular, gender role strain), at least to a certain degree, 
unconsciously affect all persons, including cisgender persons. Eradicating the 
(gendered violence produced by the) heterosexual cultural system of gender is, 
therefore, a matter of global justice and requires the practice of mandatory (binary) 
sex/gender registration to be abolished. Moreover, because mandatory (binary) 
sex/gender registration provides a legal basis for the heterosexual cultural system of 
gender to be enforced by regulation, and renders the law complicit in these various 
forms of gendered violence, this solution can equally be defended from a human 
rights perspective. 
 
This article has found that the pathologisation and medicalisation of trans* 
identities and variations of sex characteristics, as well as the absence of, or medical 
requirements for, non-binary categories relating to the legal recognition of gender 
identity, are in breach of the principle of self-determination, which is a fundamental 
component of international human rights law. Based upon personal autonomy, it 
identified the existence of an (emerging) right to gender identity and the legal 
recognition thereof, as attested to by soft law instruments, the fact that various states 
now allow the legal recognition of gender identity based purely on self-determination, 
and that some are opening up the binarity by allowing a “third” sex/gender category 
for people with variations in sex characteristics and those identifying outside the 
binary. However, only a policy of abolishing mandatory (binary and/or non-binary) 
sex/gender registration would be truly respectful of the right to gender identity and 
the legal recognition thereof, as an (emerging) human rights standard. Indeed, current 
state practices do not pursue a legitimate aim, and even assuming that they do, as 
shown in Part II, mandatory sex/gender registration does not pass the proportionality 
test. Finally, this article highlighted that concerns of public safety, public policy, or 
public health can easily be overcome and that states are still able to combat gender-
related disparities without compelling individuals to identify and be recorded in 
conformity with the heterosexual cultural system of gender. In conclusion, a human 
rights analysis of official sex/gender in the age of gender self-determination, informed 
by feminist and queer insights, finds that mandatory sex/gender registration is a 
disproportionate measure and recommends that states change their current practices. 
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